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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

Did the appeals court apply the correct legal standard?

II.

Does the Martin County legislative prayer practice violate the First Amendment
Establishment Clause?

i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The Defendants-Appellees below, who are the Petitioners before this Court, are Martin
County, West Carolina and Martin County Board.
The Plaintiff-Appellant below, who is the Respondent before this Court, is Anne
Dhaliwal.
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OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Carolina
is unreported but may be found on pages 27 through 29 of the appellate record. (R. at 27–29).
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventeenth Circuit is also unreported
but may be found on pages 32 through 34 of the appellate record. (R. at 32–34).
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The court of appeals entered judgment on February 1, 2013. (R. at 34). Petitioner filed
his petition for writ of certiorari on February 7, 2013 (R. at 36). This Court granted the petition
on May 20, 2013. (R. at 38). This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2000).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are
reviewed for clear error. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
An excerpt from the First Amendment of the United States Constitution is included in the
Appendix of this brief.

vi

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Board Meetings

The Martin County Board holds two public meetings per month. (R. at 12). In 1985, the
Board implemented a practice of opening each meeting with a prayer or invocation. (R. at 27).
One of the Board members commences each meeting by introducing the selected clergy. (R. at
2–5). For Christian chaplain, the Board members request the audience to stand, singling out any
non-participants. Id. The Board proceeds directly from the invocation into the official meeting,
offering the audience no distinction between the two. Id.
For citizens unable to attend, Martin County maintains videos and minutes of each
meeting on its website for public access. (R. at 12). The videos are archived and can be viewed
at anytime. Id. The online videos chronicle every aspect of the meeting including the prayer.
Id.
Town citizens address the Board during the open comments portion of the meetings. (R.
at 7, 13). During this time, the Board asks the individual to approach the podium microphone
and allows the speaker five minutes to voice their concerns. (R. at 7). The Board responds
immediately to the speaker with suggestions or commitments for future actions. Id.
B.

Christian Prayers

Generally, the prayers given at the Martin County Board meetings are Christian. (R. at
13). The Board refuses to instruct the clergy or prevent faith specific references within the
prayers. (R. at 13). However Martin County’s lenient approach results in sermon-like
invocations. (R. at 2–5). In 2011, countless Board meeting prayers incorporated excessive
references to Christian deities and doctrines. (R. at 2–5). The Board’s policy regarding the
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content of the prayers ensures overtly sectarian invocations and offends the non-Christian
audience members. (R. at 2–5, 13).
C.

Clergy Selection

Volunteers working for the Board privately solicit clergy within Martin County to lead a
prayer at one of the Board’s meetings. (R. at 10). The volunteers record the interested
congregations on an alphabetical list. Id. In preparation for the upcoming meeting, the Board
selects a prayer giver from the alphabetical list of local clergy. Id. Although a conflict of
interest, Board members may invite clergy from the congregation they regularly attend. (R. at
6). Chairman Gregg Doorley shows preference for his congregation by requesting his pastor to
lead prayers. Id. The Martin County Board maintains no systematic procedures for selecting
prayer leaders and no rules to prevent a conflict of interest. (R. at 6, 10).
D.

The Dhaliwals

Shortly after moving to Martin County, Anne Dhaliwal attended Martin County Board
meetings from May 2011 to September 2011. (R. at 13). On September 9, 2011, Manpreet
Dhaliwal voiced his concerns to an uncooperative Chairman Gates. Id. During his open
comment, Mr. Dhaliwal requested the Board cease the practice of commencing each meeting
with openly sectarian prayers. Id. The Board commented that Mr. Dhaliwal’s request was
unusual but stated they would consider his request. Id. Following the September meeting, the
Board ignored Mr. Dhaliwal’s request. Id. On October 20, 2011, Ms. Dhaliwal wrote a letter,
addressed to Chairman Benjamin Gates, reiterating Mr. Dhaliwal’s concerns and requesting a
meeting. Id. Chairman Gates ignored Ms. Dhaliwal’s letter, claiming the Board only addresses
requests made during the open comments section of the meetings. (R. at 10). Selectively
adhering to its own policies, the Board effectively discriminated against the Dhaliwals. Id. The
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Martin County Board continued to open its meetings with faith-based prayers, disregard the
complaints, and create a futile pursuit for the Dhaliwals. (R. at 14).
E.

Proceedings

Protecting her First Amendment right, Anne Dhaliwal filed suit against Martin County
and the Martin County Board requesting that the court declare the prayers given at the Board
meetings in violation of the U.S. Constitution and enjoining Martin County from permitting the
prayer practice to continue or ordering the Board to censor the content of the prayers. (R. at 14–
15). Martin County filed a motion to dismiss, claiming Dhaliwal did not assert a claim for which
relief is possible. (R. at 10). On Martin County’s motion to dismiss, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of West Carolina rejected Dhaliwal’s claim for an Establishment
Clause violation. Relying on Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983), the district court
stated the practice is not coercive or a danger to Dhaliwal’s rights under the First Amendment.
(R. at 28–29).
Anne Dhaliwal appealed the district court’s dismissal. (R. at 31). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventeenth Circuit performed an analysis, which looked beyond Marsh
to the subsequent Establishment Clause violation cases. (R. at 32–34). Settling on the “totality
of the circumstances” test from Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 30 (2nd Cir. 2012),
the Seventeenth Circuit concluded Martin County’s prayer practice constituted a violation of the
First Amendment Establishment Clause. (R. at 32–33). Accordingly, the appellate court
reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case. Id.
Martin County filed the petition for certiorari, and this Court granted certiorari certifying
two questions for argument: (1) Did the appeals court apply the correct legal standard; and (2)
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Does the Martin County legislative prayer practice violate the First Amendment Establishment
Clause? (R. at 37).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.
The district court erred in applying the Marsh one factor historical analysis. The
historical analysis merely focuses on one insignificant feature of the prayer practice, that it’s
historic. Reviewing only one aspect of a potential Establishment Clause violation is insufficient.
One factor evaluations result in the impermissible approval of unconstitutional practices. Thus,
the historical analysis leads to inequitable verdicts, burdening the judicial system.
The Seventeenth Circuit properly broadened its analysis to the “totality of the
circumstances.” The totality standard is especially practical for fact specific cases because it
objectively reviews all aspects of a potential Establishment Clause violation. Features of the
practice may not individually constitute a violation. However when viewed in its entirety, the
practice brazenly violates the First Amendment. Therefore the totality standard is the only
functional test resulting in impartial judgments.
II.
Martin County’s prayer practice is unconstitutional because it endorses Christianity and
affiliates the Board with one religion, disfavoring all others. The Board makes no effort to (1)
neutralize the content of the prayers; (2) modify its clergy selection procedures; (3) separate
itself from the messages within the prayers; and (4) refrain from requesting audience
participation in the prayer. Viewed in total, the Board’s practice disregards the Establishment
Clause and infringes upon Anne Dhaliwal’s First Amendment rights. Left unrestrained, Martin
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County’s practice will create insurmountable public policy concerns and unravel the fabric of our
nation.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD, APPLIED BY THE SEVENTEENTH
CIRCUIT, IS TO ANALYZE THE “TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES”
The drafters of the Bill of Rights created the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause to

prevent the government from creating and maintaining one national religion. U.S. CONST.
amend. 1. See generally Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 10–13 (1947) (discussing the
original purpose of the clause). Since 1947, this Court continues to mold its interpretation of the
Establishment Clause. Id. In Everson v. Board of Education, the Court proclaims a wall should
separate religion and the government. Id. Justice Blackmun concludes the Establishment Clause
prohibits the government from aiding or advancing any particular religion in County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 590–91 (1989). Additionally, this Court cautions any
government entity, with or without intent, appearing to prefer one religion over others will
violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 597. The government may not (1) discriminate against
individuals based on their religious preferences; (2) assign governmental authority to any church
or other divine institution; and (3) partake in considerable association with a religious institution.
Id. Lastly, the Establishment Clause protects and embraces every citizen’s freedom to choose
one religion, many religions or non-religion. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 859
(2005); accord Zeiman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 718 (2002) (maintaining world peace
requires understanding and respect for diverse religions).
A.

The Three Part Test From Lemon Provides the Foundation for the Proper
Legal Standard
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There are primarily four tests to determine whether a violation of the Establishment
Clause exists. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (establishing a 3 prong test);
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (evaluating the historical reference only);
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 594 (creating the “endorsement test”); Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30
(developing the “totality of the circumstances” test). In Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612, this Court
established its first test for an Establishment Clause violation, evaluating two state statutes
providing financial aid to religious private schools. Id. Chief Justice Burger provides a
systematic three prong test to determine a violation of the First Amendment. Id. The practice
must (1) contain a “secular legislative” motive; (2) not promote or restrain religion as its primary
purpose; and (3) not lead to unrestrained “entanglements” of government and religion. Id. To be
deemed constitutional, a practice must satisfy all three parts of the Lemon test. Id.
After 1971, the Court utilized the three part test in numerous First Amendment cases.
See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 859–63 (utilizing the first prong of the Lemon test to rule two Ten
Commandment displays unconstitutional); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602–17 (1988)
(using the Lemon test to uphold a congressional statute); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
585–90 (1987) (invalidating a Louisiana statute with the Lemon test). Although never
overturned or invalidated, the Lemon test possesses no practical application in today’s fact
specific cases, and this Court has not applied the test for decades. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 678–79 (1984).
B.

The Totality Standard from Galloway is Practical, Equitable and Promotes
Legal Efficiency

Almost two decades after Lemon, this Court again formulated a standard for violations of
the Establishment Clause in County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 594. Expanding on the third prong
of the Lemon test, this Court embraced the “endorsement test” and examined the crèche and
6

menorah displays in their contextual locations on government property to determine if they gave
the impression of endorsing or rejecting a particular religion. Id. Refining the Lemon test’s
intent-based analysis, the reasonable person standard set forth in Allegheny examined the
practice from an audience perspective, making the endorsement standard easily applicable to
diverse cases. See id. (concluding a government action, regardless of intent, must not appear to
associate the government with any particular religion); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678–79 (recognizing
only a fraction of any audience will perceive the intended message while others understand the
“objective” meaning).
Historical relevance, which led to the holding in Marsh, was only one aspect evaluated
with the endorsement standard. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603 (applying the Marsh standard would
legitimize any unconstitutional practice merely because of its traditional significance). Contra
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786 (upholding legislative prayer because the practice is firmly rooted in the
customs of the United States). However in County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603, this Court
emphasized history alone will not validate an unconstitutional practice. Thus, a one factor
analysis is not appropriate for Establishment Clause violation cases. Id. Potential violations
must be reviewed as a whole not based on one feature alone. Id.
Following Allegheny, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied
an endorsement style “totality of the circumstances” standard in Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30. The
Second Circuit reviewed the prayer practice of the town meetings using the reasonable person’s
standard. Id. at 22. Although no one feature was unconstitutional, the court held the entire
practice gave rise to an Establishment Clause violation. Id. at 26. Supporting its ruling, the
Second Circuit noted three issues: (1) the “prayer-giver selection process”; (2) the substance of
the prayers; and (3) the “actions and inactions” of prayer leaders and Board members. Id. at 30.
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The court illustrated the ease of applying the totality standard: if a reasonable person views the
prayers and concludes the government affiliates, endorses, promotes, or “disparages” one
religion, the practice is unconstitutional. Id. at 31. The Galloway standard is the most functional
and reasonable test for possible violations of the Establishment Clause. See id. at 30 (noting the
impracticability of applying a strict legal test to fact specific cases); See also Van Orden v. Perry,
545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (rejecting the concept of a test replacing “legal judgment” in
Establishment Clause violation cases).
C.

The Historical Analysis Set Forth in Marsh is Inadequate and Should Not Be
Adopted

Six years before developing the endorsement standard, a member of the Nebraska
legislature challenged the constitutionality of opening each session with a prayer. Marsh, 463
U.S. at 784–85. Focusing on the historical significance of the practice, this Court held the
drafters of the Establishment Clause opened their own sessions with a similar prayer and
certainly did not view it as a violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 787-88. Therefore, the
Court validated Nebraska’s legislative prayer practice. Id. at 791.
While deciding Marsh, the Court looks at a very narrow set of facts. Galloway, 681 F.3d
at 24. The Court concluded the prayers were not favoring or “proselytizing” one religion over
others and as a result, refused to apply the precedential Lemon test. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95.
Instead, the analysis focused on only the historical relevance of the practice. Id. The decision
did not delve into analyzing the content of the prayers. Id. Justice Stevens asserts the Court
avoids the content because it is unable to account for the numerous faith-based references within
the prayers. Id. at 823. Marsh does not provide guidance regarding any additional factors, such
as the limitations of Establishment Clause and the constitutionality of content within the prayers.
Id. at 794–95.
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The Marsh standard analyzes only one aspect of the many utilized in the Allegheny
“endorsement test.” Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603. According the Justice Brennan, the obsession
with history led this Court to overlook the essence of prayer. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 797. By
definition, prayers are unmistakably religious. Id. As a result, the Marsh standard will lead to a
government’s blatantly unconstitutional act being overlooked based on the unbalanced reliance
of a one factor analysis. The largest pitfall of Marsh is six years following the decision this
Court decided to forego the Marsh standard in deciding Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 594. Therefore,
Marsh is an unrepeatable verdict applied to a fact intensive case with no significant precedential
value. See McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 860 (alluding to Marsh is a specially made verdict that
permitted a practice even though the motive was “presumably religious”); See also Lynch, 463
U.S. at 695 (dismissing Marsh as the sole inconsistency in Establishment Clause violation cases).
This Court established the Lemon test to systematically evaluate violations of the
Establishment Clause. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. After the Lemon test proved difficult to apply,
Chief Justice Burger attempted to resolve the constitutionality of legislative prayer using merely
history. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784–85. Recognizing a one factor analysis was insufficient, Justice
Blackmun molded the third prong of the Lemon test into the “endorsement test” in Allegheny,
492 U.S. at 594. Echoing the Allegheny test, the Second Circuit developed the comprehensive
and workable totality test in Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30. The Galloway test is simple: when
viewed in its entirety by a reasonable person, the practice must not advance or condemn any faith
or belief. Id.
II.

MARTIN COUNTY’S LEGISLATIVE PRAYER PRACTICE VIOLATES THE
FIRST AMENDMENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE THEREBY UNLAWFULLY
REVOKING DHALIWAL’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
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According to Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791, the government may open legislative sessions with
a prayer. However in Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597, Justice Blackmun clarifies the government
may not use the prayer practice to endorse or advance one religion. Additionally, the
Establishment Clause prohibits government appearance of favoring or criticizing any religion.
Id. No government entity may interfere with the freedoms provided by the Establishment
Clause, such as the right to a religious preference without discrimination. McCreary Cnty., 545
U.S. at 859.
A.

Martin County’s Prayer Practice Requires an Analysis Under the Totality
Standard

To evaluate a potential violation of the First Amendment Establishment Clause, four
primary tests exist: the Lemon three prong test, the Marsh historical analysis, the Allegheny
“endorsement test,” and the Galloway totality standard. See generally Galloway, 681 F.3d at 14–
30 (providing a history of Establishment Clause violation cases). This Court abandons the
Lemon test after struggling to apply it to modern fact intensive cases. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678-79.
The Marsh historical analysis proves inadequate and inapplicable to this case. See id. at 695
(discussing Marsh and its lack of precedential value). Therefore the Martin County Board’s
prayer practice must be evaluated using the totality standard from Galloway and the very similar
endorsement analysis set forth in Allegheny. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 29.
B.

The Aggregate of Martin County’s Prayer Practice Constitutes a Violation of
the Establishment Clause

Viewed comprehensively, Martin County’s prayer practice is problematic. First, the
references within the prayers held at the Martin County Board meetings are overtly sectarian and
offensive. See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30 (evaluating the substance of the invocations). The
Martin County Board opens the majority of their meetings with Christian faith-based prayers.
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(R. at 13). In 2010, Christian clergy led the invocation over eighty-one percent of the time. Id.
From May to September 2011, non-Christian chaplain led only two prayers. Id. Additionally,
all but one prayer incorporated excessive sermon-like references to Christian deities and
doctrines. (R. at 2–5). Three Martin County prayer presenters were particularly offensive to
non-Christian audience members. Id. Incorporating the audience, Father Samuelson’s directed
his invocation to “Our Heavenly Father.” (R. at 2). Reverend Hector Ramirez assumed the
audience’s beliefs were similar to his own when he used “us,” “our” and “we” extensively
throughout his prayer. (R. at 4). Julie Lane outrageously requested clarity while “we” continue
to construct the Lord’s kingdom. (R. at 4).
The Board does nothing to prevent discrimination by censoring the content of the
invocations, and as a result, the unrestrained references clearly derogate non-Christian religions.
Compare Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992) (observing prayers with faith intensive
references are frequently viewed as antagonistic), with Galloway, 681 F.3d at 31 (asking
audience members to pray in the name of Christian deities is a loaded request), and Wynne v.
Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 300 (4th Cir. 2004) (invoking gods specific to one faith is
prejudicial). Martin County’s predominantly Christian prayer practice places governmental
approval on one religion, isolating Anne Dhaliwal and other non-Christians. Galloway, 681 F.3d
at 31–32; See also Zeiman, 536 U.S. at 720 (allowing only prayers of Protestant faith
discriminated against non-Protestants).
Second, Martin County’s clergy selection procedures are arbitrary and produce skewed
results. See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30. (reviewing the process for choosing clergy). In an
affidavit submitted to the Seventeenth Circuit, Chairman Benjamin Gates vaguely describes the
procedures. (R. at 10). According to Gates, volunteers send letters to clergy within the county
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inviting them to participate in the prayer. Id. After the clergy responds with interest, their name
is included on the alphabetical list held by Martin County. Id. Once a month, the Board selects
the next month’s chaplains from the alphabetical list and sends a letter requesting their
attendance. Id.
Choosing clerics within Martin County substantially limits the diversity of the prayers
and ensures non-Christian religions will be ignored. See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 27 (selecting
clergy within the town resulted in exclusively Christian prayer leaders). Additionally, Martin
County’s lack of formal procedures provides no guidance for selecting and inviting clergy. (R.
at 10). The non-public invitations sent to a few local clergy, selected by the Board’s volunteers,
restrict the list of potential prayer leaders, leaving the diverse community misrepresented. See
Galloway, 681 F.3d at 27 (publicizing the opportunity to lead invocations is a more acceptable
method). Martin County’s unsystematic and informal selection process supports a violation of
the First Amendment. Id.
Third, the Martin County Board’s conduct aligns the town officials with the messages
contained in the prayers. See id. at 32 (examining the activities of the clerics and Board
members). The Board offers the audience no explanation regarding the purpose of the prayer or
distinction between the meeting and invocation. (R. at 2–5). One of the Martin County Board
members begins each session by asking the audience to stand for the Christian based prayers. Id.
However for the non-Christian invocations, the Board member merely offers the option to stand
if the audience prefers. Id.
The Martin County Board’s refusal to offer clarification affiliates the Board with the
Christian prayers. See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30 (disassociating the prayers from the meetings is
the Board’s responsibility). Further, the Board requests Dhaliwal’s and other attendees’

12

participation in the Christian prayers and places non-believers in a state of inner turmoil. See id.
at 32 (recognizing the audience’s difficult position). Non-Christian attendees, such as Dhaliwal
are confronted with the dilemma of abandoning their own beliefs or publicly disregarding the
request of the Board. Id. Anne Dhaliwal’s and other reasonable attendees’ participation in the
meeting is subject to their standing for the prayer. Id. This pressure to conform is the type of
discrimination experienced by the drafters of the First Amendment and the very rationale
underlying the Establishment Clause. Everson, 330 U.S. at 10–13. The Martin County Board’s
requests to stand for the prayers show preference to the Christian faith, pressures the audience to
favor Christianity, discriminates against individuals with contrary beliefs and violates the
Establishment Clause. See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 32–33 (illustrating the attendee’s reasonable
inferences resulting from the Board member’s request).
Through overtly Christian references within the prayers, unsystematic selection
procedures and conduct of the members, the Martin County Board expresses a preference for
Christianity. Id. at 30. Viewed in its entirety by a reasonable person, the invocations align the
Board with one religion, violating the Establishment Clause. Id. Pressuring Dhaliwal to
suppress her own beliefs for purposes of participating in the meetings, the Martin County Board
denies her fundamental right to practice any religion without government discrimination. See
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985) (noting the First Amendment religion clauses have a
symbiotic relationship, protecting each citizen’s right to select their own beliefs and to reject the
predominant religion).
C.

Public Policy Concerns Support Adopting the Totality Standard

In Marsh, the Court evades the Lemon test by focusing on a one factor analysis and
approves a practice with conspicuous spiritual motives. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 860. In
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Lynch, 465 U.S. at 695, Justice Brennan asserts Marsh uniquely deviated from the typical
evaluation of Establishment Clause cases. The Marsh analysis is distinctive, and although
frequently referenced, this Court has never repeated the analysis in any subsequent cases. See id.
(applying Marsh analysis to no other cases and anticipating no future departures from the
accepted standards). The facts of the Marsh case, evaluated by the standards developed in
Lemon, Allegheny and Galloway, prove to be a violation of the Establishment Clause. See
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796 (disapproving Marsh under the Lemon test); See also Allegheny, 492
U.S. at 594 (developing the Lemon test’s third prong into the “endorsement test”); Galloway, 681
F.3d at 30 (progressing from the “endorsement test” to the similar totality standard). The Marsh
opinion forms an exception to precedent and shockingly approves a violation of the First
Amendment. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796. As a result, the Marsh standard promotes an unjust and
inconsistent judicial system full of arbitrary verdicts. Id.
Incorporating Lemon and Allegheny, the totality standard of Galloway fairly and
objectively evaluates the entire situation. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30. Martin County does not
censor the prayers and is unable to control every word spoken by the selected clergy. (R. at 10).
As a result, the constitutionality of the prayer practice should not be judged solely on the content
of the prayers. See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 34 (holding individually, the features of the invocation
practice did not constitute a violation, but viewed in total, the practice is unconstitutional).
However, Martin County is able to control other aspects of the practice, such as the chaplain
selection process and preventing their behavior from associating the Board with the prayers. Id.
The totality standard allows Martin County and other government entities to offset aspects
outside of their control with ones inside their control, resulting in predictability in the law. See
id. (indicating the excessive Christian based references within the prayers were not enough to
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violate the Establishment Clause). Thus, the “totality of the circumstances” test provides
equitable judgments and encourages efficiency in the judicial system.
Society demands predictability and structure within the law. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 331 (1989). Precedent is crucial in the United States judicial system because it promotes
efficiency and provides the structure by which citizens are able to predict the outcome of their
behaviors. Id. More importantly, precedent ensures individuals receive fair treatment without
arbitrary, unreliable verdicts. Id. While the Marsh standard undermines the American legal
system, the Galloway totality test advances society’s interests.
CONCLUSION
Religious freedoms are the first fundamental rights secured by the drafters of the Bill of
Rights. The First Amendment promises all citizens the right to choose their own beliefs without
government interference. Martin County, through its prayer practice, is promoting Christianity
at the expense of all other religions and unlawfully violating Anne Dhaliwal’s First Amendment
rights. For the preceding reasons, Dhaliwal requests this Court affirm the Seventeenth Circuit’s
judgment.
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APPENDIX

FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
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